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10 September 2020 was a watershed moment for the Court of Justice’s
independence: the Court, through its Vice-President, has agreed to dismiss its own
sitting member without even notifying her of the appeal against the suspensory order
protecting her tenure guaranteed in the EU Treaties. It did so by arguing, effectively,
that the Member States could dismiss members of the Court at will, and that such
decisions were beyond judicial review: AG Sharpston’s fight for the independence of
the Court, according to that very Court through its Vice-President, had ‘prima facie’
‘no prospect of success’ (para. 29 of both orders infra). 
What happened on 10 September 2020? 
Without formal prior notice, or publicity that appeal proceedings were brought against
the Order of Judge Collins (Act II of the drama), on the morning of 10 September
2020, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice, Judge Rosario Silva de Lapuerta
delivered two Orders (Case C-423/20 P(R) and C-424/20 P(R)), setting aside the
Order of Judge Collins of 4 September 2020. AG Sharpston was thus dismissed, à
l’hongroise (paras. 62 and 79) et à la polonaise (para. 40), notwithstanding the
tenure term set in the EU Treaties, thus in direct breach of Article 253 TFEU.
The day after the Order of Judge Collins was made, on 5 September 2020, both the
Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States lodged
an appeal against the Order of Judge Collins. The appeal was lodged ex parte. No
notice of this appeal was given to AG Sharpston. The first time AG Sharpston heard
of the mere existence of the appeal that was brought was when the Vice-President
set aside the Order of Judge Collins on the morning of 10 September 2020, whilst
her replacement was being sworn into office. AG Sharpston was not presented with
an opportunity to present written or oral argument before the Court of Justice on
anything at all.
In absence of AG Sharpston, but in the presence of Mr. Rantos, as
Luxembourgian Paperjam reports, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice ruled
that the appeal brought by the Council and Representatives of the Governments
of the Member States was admissible. This Order of the Vice-President was
without mentioning that the Order of Judge Collins was not final, or taking account
of the reasonable deadline that he set, within his mandate as per Article 157(1)
of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, for the respondents to submit
observations set for 11 September 2020 had not even expired. 
The Vice-President ruled that AG Sharpston did not have a ‘prima facie case’ in
relation to the main case in which the ‘interim interim’ measures Order by Judge
Collins had been issued (para. 22 of both Orders). She found that Judge Collins
erred in law (para. 29 of both Orders) since the act in question under Article 253
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TFEU was adopted by the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States and not the Council of the European Union (para. 24 of both Orders) on
the assumption that no case can, per se, be brought against the decisions of the
Member States not meeting in Council or the European Council. This was apparently
deemed to be the case, even in the context, like that of the case of AG Sharpston,
where such Representatives expressly lack the clear and precise competence to
act conferred on them by the EU Treaties. Vice-President Silva de Lapuerta thus
ruled as if Article 253 TFEU did not require expressis verbis that the appointments
be done for ‘six years’. The six-year mandate of the members of the Court, as Vidigal
points out, is not ‘until the [Member States] decide otherwise’. 
Moreover, found the Vice-President, the acts of the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States could not be subjected to judicial review,
given they fall outside the scope of Article 263 TFEU (para. 28 of both Orders).
To reinforce her claim of prima facie inadmissibility, the Vice-President further
relied on Parliament v. Council and Commission (C-181/91 and C-248/91) to claim
that ‘representatives of their governments, and thus collectively exercising the
powers of the Member States, are not subject to judicial review by the courts of
the Union’ (para. 26 of both Orders). The argument however appears faulty on the
face of it, since the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States
would obviously be limited to appointing 11 Advocates General, as Judge Collins
rightly pointed in his Order. In the absence of a vacancy, the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States cannot legitimately refer to Article 253 TFEU to
appoint yet another Advocate General if the consequence is undoing the previous
appointment, in direct breach of the six-year term of office established by that very
provision. 
In other words, the Vice-President failed to make clear that the Representatives of
the Governments of the Member States simply did not have the power to appoint
any Advocate General legally using Article 253 TFEU without the direct breach of
the EU Treaties, as long as a vacancy has not arisen, which was the case at issue.
The reasoning offered by the Vice-President thus authorises abuse of power by
the Member States in the cases where the scope of action taken by their common
accord should be very specific and clearly articulated in the EU Treaties. Under
Article 253 TFEU, Member States are acting in a capacity that the EU Treaties
give them the competence to do so, and is not just an exercising of ad hoc actions
outside of the EU legal framework. Certain of the Court’s powerlessness in the face
of an ad hoc decision of the Member States not called for by Article 253 TFEU and,
indeed, taken in direct breach of this provision, the Vice-President took the final
decision to set aside the ‘interim interim’ measures Order of Judge Collins (paras.
31-36 of both Orders). 
In essence, this means that no substantive decision has been reached in the cases
launched by AG Sharpston in front of the General Court, even though the abuse
of Article 253 TFEU procedure by the Member States and the neglect of the clear
guarantee of AG mandate established by the same provision, has had an upper
hand for now. Eventually it is theoretically possible that the General Court could thus
consider whether AG Sharpston’s dismissal was unlawful or not, but very difficult,
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given the finding of the Vice-President of no prima facie case in the first place.
Moreover, the practical consequences for the independence of the Court of Justice
cannot at this point be undone and are difficult to pin-point. This is because removing
her successor from the bench would hardly be possible: exactly the situation with the
Pyrrhic victory of the Commission in Commission v. Hungary (Judicial Retirement),
in the absence of effective interim measures to ensure that such situations never
arise as demonstrated, for example, in Commission v Poland (Independence of
the Supreme Court). Indeed the only way for the newly-installed AG Rantos to be
removed would be for members of the Court to do so, in accordance with the strict
rules contained in the Statute of the Court (or shockingly, via another unreviewable
act by the Member States in breach of a six-year mandate). 
Core problems of the Orders of the Vice-President
Let us walk through a selection of flaws in Vice-President’s reasoning. To single out
just a few of the most significant ones, we focus on the following: (1) The decision
of the Vice-President is based on a presumption repugnant to primary law, which
consists in the lack of independence of the Court of Justice and non-applicability
of the principle of irremovability to the members of the Court. This presumption is
flawed and does a lot of harm to the institution. (2) The presumption is coupled with
the erroneous assumption of Member States’ impunity in undermining independence
of the Court of Justice, even in the cases of direct violation of the provisions of
primary law on the security of tenure, when their actions not called for by the EU
Treaties and undoing primary law guarantees are taken to be unreviewable. (3) The
fact that AG Sharpston was not even notified of the appeal, while AG-to-be Rantos
was sitting in the room, is just one in a line of violations of the core principles of
procedural justice and fairness enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter giving the whole
affair an unusual sense of injustice. (4) The Order of the Vice-President was issued
with grave procedural violations and the lack of any urgency is obvious. The result
is a harmful farce of a situation, as opposed to reaching sound conclusions after a
proper hearing on the pending interim measures proceedings before the General
Court. Moreover, the Orders seem to be capable to amount to de facto deciding the
case on the merits while hearing an appeal against a provisional interim measure.
Point 1) The Starting Assumption: The lack of
independence of the Court of Justice
Instead of striving to ensure that the Court of Justice meets the high standard of
judicial independence and irremovability of judges established in its case law,
the Vice-President has precisely renounced to those principles, which the Court
has otherwise been quite successful in elucidating in a line of recent judgments
that we discussed in Act I. This unceremonious affair through the Orders of Vice-
President Silva de Lapuerta has confirmed that members of the Court of Justice can
be removed from office by the Member States, at will, through an action such as the
one taken to remove Advocate General Sharpston from office, and install Mr. Rantos
in her place. 
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The fact that the Vice-President in essence argues that there is no appeal against
the decision of the Member States taken on foot of Article 253 TFEU, which the EU
Treaties empower them to make by common accord, even when such a decision is
uncalled for. The Orders curtail of the promise of Les Verts – one of the Court’s most
celebrated judgments – let alone have regard to all the recent case law of the Court
of Justice on judicial independence. The Order of the Vice-President can be seen
to be in direct contradiction with the terms of the mandate set in the EU Treaties.
These developments drastically undermine the judicial independence of the Court of
Justice. 
Point 2) The Assumption that Member States can
violate the EU Treaties with impunity
A related assumption that the Member States can appoint members of the Court in
direct violation of Article 253 TFEU by breaching both the security of six year tenure
and ignoring the lack of a vacancy on the Court required to invoke Article 253 TFEU
in the first place. This has the potential to undo any idea of judicial independence in
the EU: not a situation in line with the rule of law, thus reminiscent of Hungary and
Poland, not of the EU as a whole, pointing in the direction of letting the ‘Masters of
the Treaties’ to dwell beyond the law. 
The Vice-President of the Court of Justice took a very strict reading of whom
comes within the scope of a judicially review act on the basis of the normal action
for annulment procedure under Article 263 TFEU. The Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States appear, thus far, to be beyond the ability of
judicial review of the Court. But this cannot be correct. The actions of the Member
States in this instance are, after all, procedural irregularities that can be subject to
judicial review. It is not about, and has never been about that of the person to whom
has been appointed, which would quite obviously fall within the political question
doctrine. Moreover, further damage of the Court’s short-sighted approach could
be mitigated by the initiating of proceedings in a national court of Member States
against a particular government, as one component of the decision-maker of the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States occur as Professor
Platon suggested to us. The room for optimism here is limited, but it is an avenue.
When faced with such a question, the national court could make a request for a
preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU to the Court of Justice, asking whether
the Court of Justice is validly and lawfully composed, or other associated questions
arising from this entire saga. 
Yet, the very idea that the Council on the one hand; and the Representatives of
the Governments of the Member States on the other hand; are separate entities in
entirely fictitious. For all intents and purposes, and in reality, they are one-in-the-
same. This can be analogised to the situation arisen in NF v European Council.
There, the ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ was found to be beyond a judicially reviewable
act at first instance, and the less-than-promising read in that case which could
not attribute an action to the European Council, even though in reality, it was.
However, it has been alluded to by the President of the Court in an essay to honour
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a former colleague (page 10), that there is nothing in principle from the Court of
Justice through another procedure, of such a case coming before the Court again,
reviewing whether such activity can be judicially reviewable, and better deciphering
what is an act within the scope of judicial review by the Court of Justice. 
The apparent lack of judicial reviewability of actions of the Member States that are
either sanctioned by, or have effects on the EU legal order, we contend, is not a
settled question in EU law, and is still up for debate in order for judicial review to
be found in appropriate instances, like the situation of AG Sharpston. There will be
one day in which the Court of Justice will have to take the necessary steps towards
ensuring that such decisions, when they affect the workings of EU institutions, are
brought within the proper scope of judicial control. 
Point 3) Violation of Article 47 CFR. What should
have happened in a constitutional system based on
the rule of law
The Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (CJEU RoP) state in Article 160(5)
that ‘[t]he application shall be served on the opposite party, and the [Vice-] President
shall prescribe a short time limit within which that party may submit written or oral
observations’. This did not happen for AG Sharpston. Whilst Article 160(7) states
that the Vice-President ‘may grant the application even before the observations of
the opposite party have been submitted’, it would appear that the only reason that
this would happen is for reasons of exceptional urgency. This was not the situation in
this case. 
In last week’s Order of Judge Collins, the defending parties to the proceedings were
given one week, until 11 September 2020, to lodge their written submissions to
the General Court. This was so that the presiding judge of the General Court could
fully adjudicate on the application for interim measures, pending a case full on the
legality of the appointment made by the Member States, as per the ordinary course
of events in Case T-550/20. The Rules of Procedure of the General Court permit a
case to be expedited on an application to the Court, which the applicant made. 
The sensible solution of Judge Collins ensured that the defending parties, the
Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States had the
possibility to submit written observations, and guaranteeing the rights of all parties
of their rights of Article 47 of the CFR. Instead, however, rather than submit written
observations, the Member States went ahead and appealed the Order of Judge
Collins to the Court of Justice of the European Union, asking for that Order to be
set aside. However, the actual interim measures proceedings had not yet been
concluded, as Judge Collins was still seized of the interim measures application. 
When initiating their appeal, the Member States had requested that the Vice-
President of the Court of Justice rule on the appeal against the Order of Judge
Collins without hearing AG Sharpston (paragraph 10 of both Orders). The Vice-
President of the Court of Justice could have acted in a similar way to Judge Collins,
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given that she was now seized of an appeal of an ‘interim interim’ measure. Vice-
President Silva de Lapuerta could have made an Order to the effect that the legal
team of AG Sharpston were given a similar seven-days to lodge their written
response to the appeal brought against the Order of Judge Collins. Regrettably, and
in violation of Article 47 CFR, she did not do so, and the Court of Justice never got to
see AG Sharpston’s legal position as regards the Order of Judge Collins.
Prima facie, there was no compelling reason for the Vice-President to act the way in
which she did, given that the interim measures proceedings were still pending before
Judge Collins. We initially titled Act I of this drama as ‘it’s urgent’, given that the
speed at which the Member States attempted to appoint a new Advocate General
was quite striking. The urgency that existed for Judge Collins issuing his Order did
not apply to Vice-President Silva de Lapuerta issuing her Orders. The issue after
Judge Collins issued his Order, therefore, lost urgency, and Vice-President Silva de
Lapuerta should have rightly dismissed the appeal, letting the Order of Judge Collin’s
stand whilst he was still seized on the interim measures application, for which he had
not yet delivered his final interim measures decision. 
It was not necessary for the speed at which Mr. Rantos entered into office as an
Advocate General and member of the Court to proceed in such a rushed manner.
The Vice-President of the Court of Justice acted, just like the Member States, with
unnecessary haste. Article 47 CFR states that ‘[e]eveyone shall have the possibility
of being advised, defended and represented’, as analysed extensively by Pech. It is
submitted that AG Sharpston’s rights to be defended were not respected, given that
the Order of Vice-President Silva de Lapuerta has, in effect, resulted in the entering
into office of Mr. Rantos as Advocate General, thus depriving her of her office (and
the Court of its independence). 
Point 4) Abuse of the interim measures procedure
The outcome is extremely near-sighted. With the current interim measures
application now set aside through the Orders of the Vice-President in Cases
C-423/20 P(R) and C-424/20 P(R), the case that AG Sharpston lodged on 4
September 2020 (Case T-550/20) now returns to the General Court to be heard
on the merits of the substantive case. The General Court will now have to decide
whether to grant the application of AG Sharpston for the case to be accelerated,
but this is unlikely. Through the Orders of the Vice-President, and the secret, swiftly
arranged swearing-in of the new Advocate General to replace her, her pending
cases have now lost the trust of what their outcome was set to achieve – her
remaining in office, in line with her mandate guaranteed by the EU Treaties. It is
tantamount to deciding the entire substance of a case on an interim measures
cases. As reported by Joshua Rozenberg, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice
has ‘purported to decide the entire case on an ex parte application against an ex
parte freezing order’.
In terms of immediate effects, her cases (Case T-180/20, Case T-184/20, and Case
T-550/20) are now a fait accompli. Yet the General Court can still decide itself on the
legality of the various actions that AG Sharpston has challenged – the declaration of
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the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, dated 29 January
2020 (Case T-180/20); the decision of the President of the Court of Justice of
31 January 2020 to declare a vacancy on the Court and to initiate the procedure
for the appointment of a successor; and the decision of the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States to appoint a new Advocate General (Case
T-550/20). Individually or collectively, these three cases now offer the General Court,
in a well-thought out, and clearly reasoned way, how it believes such cumulative
procedural flaws in the EU legal order can, and must be corrected. When the case is
appealed to the Court of Justice, which the losing party will, they too ought to ensure
that such basic flaws are corrected, to prevent any irregularities like the ones seen in
these three Acts from every happening again. 
Long-term implications
Normally, a new member of the Court entering into office is a wonderful occasion
for the person concerned. It is done is an open, public manner, with celebrations
to mark the occasion. They are on occasion even streamed online on the Court’s
website. This affair, however, marks a stark contrast to the norm, in which the
swearing into office of a new member of the Court happened under cloak-and-
dagger, with extensive administrative cooperation in the background so that the new
Advocate General could enter into office immediately after the Orders of the Vice-
President were delivered on the morning of 10 September 2020. 
What the Orders of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice have done is effectively
licence and sanction any of the members of the Court, including judges, to be
removed from office at the will of the Member States through actions on the basis
of Article 253 TFEU. Make no mistake – what has occurred here in this affair is the
Member States successfully sacking a member of the Court. AG Sharpston’s tenure
as a member of the Court has been terminated in a way that is not as explicitly set
down in the EU Treaties and Statute of the Court. The question therefore has to
be: why did the Court, through the Orders of the Vice-President on 10 September
2020, let this happen? To this, we have no straightforward answer. Yet how can
the ‘principle of irremovability’ that the Court has been using in its judgments of late
continue to be used as a ground for reasoning when the Court’s own members do
not possess the same protection for irremovability? 
Even if Strasbourg could be an option to further try to defend the basic tenets of
independence of the Court of Justice, the track record of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) in substance on such cases is quite weak as Kosa# and
Šipulová explain, many a victory of the illegally dismissed prominent court member
notwithstanding. Crucially, the ECtHR does not demand the restoration of the status
quo ante, which means that the illegally dismissed court members cannot regain
office in the context where the security of tenure, precisely, it the crux of the matter.
However, the ECtHR also has case law that justice must not only be done, but it also
must seem to be done. In this sense, it is difficult to claim that justice was seen to be
done to AG Sharpston. 
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As parties that instigated these events, the Member States must hang their head
in shame. Separately, the Court of Justice has failed to protect one of its own
members. A tragic drama that, as custom, culminates in a tragedy. Kumm is
absolutely right: ‘Courts are not simply engaged in applying rules or interpreting
principles. They assess justifications’ (at 144). This is something that the Vice-
President has not done. Worse still, the Vice-President foreclosed any serious
conversation in the absence of the navy and the army. The only weapon that the
Court of Justice has is the clarity of the argument and the ability to be crystal clear
and absolutely convincing. There is simply nothing else in stock. The Orders of the
Vice-President are truly a low point on this count. 
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